Stakeholders often control vital resources for decision makers, and this can lead decision makers to take stakeholder opinions into account when making important decisions. This process can be complicated by a number of factors. First, many important decisions involve risk and uncertainty. When the outcome is uncertain, how does a decision maker take the views of stakeholders into account? Second, many decision makers are accountable to multiple different stakeholder groups with different preferences. How do these heterogeneous stakeholder groups affect the process of decision making? More generally, do these stakeholder considerations lead to decisions that are not socially optimal?
INTRODUCTION
Decision making is a central aspect of organizational life (Simon, 1947; March & Simon, 1958) , and scholars from a variety of disciplines have investigated the process of decision making. Most work on decision making has focused on one of two approaches -investigating heuristics and preferences at the individual level, or investigating the role of group and aggregation processes in multi-actor scenarios. The former includes classic work on biases (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and risk taking (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987) , while the latter includes work on the aggregation of biases (e.g., Kerr, MacCoun & Kramer, 1996) , groupthink (e.g., Janis, 1972) and aggregation mechanisms (e.g., Hastie & Kameda, 2005) .
A significant, but less-studied, complication in real-world decision making is that the decision maker is forced to make tradeoffs that weigh the interests of one stakeholder group versus those of others. This may be true of external stakeholders, including communities and governments, and internal stakeholders, including different divisions or geographic locations. For example, as part of the Carnegie tradition's work on decision making, Cyert and March (1963) talk extensively about decision making being affected by conflicting interests within the organization. While prior research has discussed the role of politics and stakeholder pressures (primarily in terms of organizational identity) in factors like organizational adaptation (Tripsas, 2009 ) and learning (Kogut & Zander, 1996) , the decision making literature is largely silent on how stakeholder pressures impact the process of decision making. Recent work has highlighted this gap. Gavetti, Levinthal & Ocasio (2007: p. 532 ) cite political processes and pressures as a missing pillar of recent work in the Carnegie tradition, especially as they relate to decision making. Similarly, Reynolds, Schultz & Heckman (2006: p. 285) opened their study on ethics in decision making with the statement that, "Stakeholder theory is widely recognized as a management theory, yet very little research has considered its implications for individual managerial decision making." Classic literature on decision making in political science has highlighted the role that power and politics play in decision making processes (see Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992 , for a review), but has largely focused on politics between different decision makers and has taken the heterogeneous preferences of decision makers as given, while ignoring the stakeholders that likely drive much of this heterogeneity. Literatures on stakeholder management and managerial accountability have discussed the idea that managers might take the preferences of stakeholders into account (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) , but the mechanisms of these effects have been underdeveloped. Meanwhile, the broader literature on stakeholder theory doesn't typically consider behavioral factors affecting decision-making. In fact, a recent view of the "state of the art" in stakeholder theory by some of the most notable experts in the field (Freeman, et. al., 2010) contained only a single reference to decision making, stating that the decision making process should be clear to stakeholders so they can decide where to be involved (pp. 188-189) .
We seek to deepen and clarify the field's understanding of the process linking decision making and stakeholders, both from an individual and a multi-actor perspective. Our central goal is an investigation of how stakeholder involvement and influence affects the decision making process and outcomes. We do this by focusing on decision making in the context of hurricane evacuation orders. Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans, LA, in August of 2005, provides an illustrative example of both the complexity of hurricane evacuation decision making and the role of stakeholders in influencing the process. In the case of Katrina, the predicted strength of the storm at landfall was very uncertain, as it dropped to a tropical storm categorization after brushing south Florida before strengthening back up to Category Five status before landfall. The hurricane trajectory was also uncertain, with the storm first headed towards the Florida panhandle, then towards Mississippi, before finally turning towards New Orleans. An additional complication is that, due to the time to evacuate a city like New Orleans, decisions on evacuation must be made 72 hours before landfall. On top of all of this uncertainty, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin had multiple stakeholders providing input to his decision making process. President Bush and Louisiana Governor Blanco both urged evacuations, and the director of the National Hurricane Center (NHC) personally called and urged Nagin to evacuate. Nagin's staff members also had their own opinions that they conveyed to him, as did elected officials in nearby regions. Local residents and businesses were frustrated by an unnecessary evacuation from Hurricane Ivan in late 2004, and the costs of unnecessary evacuations (both financially and politically) were significant enough that Nagin was concerned about the government's legal liability from another false evacuation (Nolan, 2005) . As a result of the uncertainty and conflicting pressures, Nagin did eventually order a mandatory evacuation, but the order went out less than 24 hours before Katrina made landfall, and many residents did not prepare amply for the storm. This example illustrates not only the complexity of the decision, but also the multiplicity of stakeholders with active, vested interests in the decision.
The context of hurricane evacuation decision making is especially appropriate for understanding the influence of stakeholders on individual and multi-actor decision making for three reasons. First, decisions around hurricanes involve a great deal of uncertainty and even higher stakes. Second, there are high-powered stakeholders that are intimately involved with and affected by the decisions, including elected and appointed officials, local businesses, and individual citizens. These stakeholders represent potentially conflicting interests and possess multiple means of influencing the decision making process. Third, evacuation orders utlimately stem from a single individual -typically the mayor or county manager -but are made in a context with many other actors, both advising the county manager and making similar decisions in nearby counties. Our approach to studying hurricane evacuations is to use primary and secondary qualitative data to build a simple model of how differing interests and information are used. We then use the model to offer specific propositions about decision making in the context of hurricane evacuations, as well as provide a complementing more general proposition for other decision contexts. Where available, we offer anecdotal qualitative and quantitative data to illustrate the proposition.
Our study makes three primary contributions. First, our integration of stakeholder perspectives into decision making theory provides a simple model of how stakeholder influences affect the decision making process for individuals and groups. Our perspective emphasizes the role of tradeoffs that decision makers face between the interests of different stakeholders, and the critical importance of the costs of different types of errors. Our approach provides a starting point for reintegrating the role of politics and stakeholders into the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963) , where politics were seen as important originally but most subsequent work has either focused only on internal politics or ignored the role of politics altogether (Argote & Greve, 2007; Gavetti, Levinthal & Ocasio, 2007) . The model that we offer and use to analyze the decision making process for hurricane evacuations is simple and flexible enough to be readily implemented in other contexts and for other types of decision making tasks that involve costs for type I and type II errors. Second, the propositions that we offer below based on this model in the context of hurricane evacuation each have specific contributions back to the literature on decision making, both for crisis and high-risk situations and decision making more broadly. These include propositions about how the salience of different stakeholders may change over time depending on the stakeholder's means of exerting influence, that extreme uncertainty may make judgment mistakes very salient, that stakeholder pressure may lead actors to imitate others to provide political "cover" for their actions, and that political concerns may make overriding decisions very difficult for managers. These points and others are discussed in greater detail below. Third, the propositions and analysis translate well to other similar contexts -namely those with high levels of irreducible uncertainty, high stakes for mistakes, and stakeholders on multiple sides with vested interests in the decisions. This paper also has clear and important implications for policy and practice related to hurricane evacuation decision making. While there is much research related to both the decision process of residents on whether or not to heed evacuation warnings (Baker, 1991 (Baker, , 1995 Gladwin, et al., 2001) , as well as meteorological research targeting improvements in hurricane forecasting accuracy (Goldenberg, et al., 2001) , research is lacking in terms of how such evacuation order decisions are made. And yet, without unattainablyperfect hurricane forecasts, decisions will still be subject to errors -both false alarms or unpredicted hits.
Policy makers need a model that allows them to consider the differential costs of each type of error and build structures and processes that make the appropriate tradeoff between error types. This study offers both specific recommendations on these issues, as well as providing a framework for further conversation about improving the decision making process for hurricane evacuations. Our conclusions also generalize to other high uncertainty, high risk contexts such as nuclear power plants, terror attacks, and airport security discussed in other organizational research (e.g., Marcus & Nichols, 1999; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) .
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the factors and players involved in hurricane risk management, specifically regarding evacuation order decisions. Section 3 develops and describes our model, which draws on the management literatures on the dynamics of decision making (Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Hogarth, 1987; Shapira, 1995) , and the structure of organizational decision making (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986; Csaszar, 2011 ) -both overlaid with models of stakeholder influence (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Mitchell, Agle & Woods, 1997) -to assess when and why decision making may stray from the socially optimal outcome. In Section 4, we use the conceptual model to offer propositions about sources of inefficiency in evacuation decision making as resulting from stakeholder influences, as well as for decisions in general, and provide qualitative and quantitative data that illustrate the propositions.
Section 5 returns discusses our theory and generalizes the findings to other contexts.
HURRICANE RISK MANAGEMENT
Making evacuation decisions in the face of approaching hurricanes is especially difficult because of the complexity of the decision itself. Despite significant technological advances, there is still an irreducible level of uncertainty. Despite the repeated nature of hurricanes, different hurricanes in different locations require different responses. Despite efforts to minimize the damage or cost of any given decision, the effective costs of mistakes -in terms of unnecessary evacuations or unpredicted direct hits -are enormous.
And despite the fact that the ultimate decision often rests with a single person, there are many stakeholders that passively and actively figure into consideration. In this section, we provide background on hurricane evacuations before discussing our model of the decision making process in Section 3.
The Process of Evacuation Decision Making
During a hurricane threat, the process of deciding whether or not to issue an evacuation involves many parties. The primary party is the NHC, which issues forecasts on the projected path and intensity.
Based on these forecasts, the NHC issues hurricane watches (possible hurricane force winds within the specified area, usually issued 48 hours before the onset of tropical storm force winds) and warnings (expected hurricane force winds within the specified area, usually issued 36 hours before the onset of tropical storm force winds) for the affected counties. In Florida, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) acts as a middleman between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state counties. The DCA is responsible for providing a recommendation to counties regarding evacuations. It holds conference calls throughout the progression of the storm with county emergency representatives, and gathers information on what each county is doing about the storm, what their plans are and what resources they may need. It is the DCA's responsibility to allocate resources across the counties before, during and after a storm.
At the county level, most of the decision making analysis occurs at the state's Office of Emergency Management (OEM). Staff at the OEM sift through information provided by the NHC, and formulate a recommendation on whether or not to evacuate, and more importantly, when to begin evacuation procedures. While the staff and ultimately the director of the OEM make a recommendation regarding evacuations, it is the mayor or the county manager who has the sole authority and responsibility to issue an evacuation. In this paper we refer to decision makers as those who are authorized to issue an evacuation decision, as distinct from the technical staff of the NHC whom we refer to as forecasters. The structure and major players in the process are summarized in Figure 1 .
-------Insert Figure 1 here ------
The Complexity of Evacuation Decision Making
The role of the county manager in charge of evacuation decisions is becoming more complicated every year with continued population growth in the coastal regions prone to hurricane activity. Between 1980 and 2004, thirty-eight hurricanes hit the United States (thirteen categorized as major hurricanes, i.e. Category 3, 4, or 5), with the majority making landfall in the southeastern United States (Blake, Rappaport, Jarrell & Landsea, 2005) . Of the ten costliest hurricane hits during that period, eight hit the southeast (five in Florida alone) causing an estimated total of $86.7 billion in damages. Meanwhile, during that same period the population of Florida increased by more than 75% (from just under ten million to more than seventeen million), with half of that growth due to a massive migration wave from other parts of the United States (Smith & Cody, 2010) . The volume of storms combined with the dramatic change in population has greatly complicated the county manager's task.
A key complication is "clearance time", or the amount of time needed to evacuate a community before tropical storm force winds arrive. As population increases, clearance time also increases. Clearance time is vital for decisions on hurricane evacuations because the necessary time is often more than 48 hours in metropolitan areas, and up to 84 hours in a large community such as Miami. Hence, evacuation decisions often are made prior to an official hurricane warning made by the NHC, since many times these are made only 48 hours in advance of a storm's arrival, and are often based on storm forecasts that are extremely unreliable. In 2010 the margin of error for a three day (72 hour) forecast was about 125 miles in either direction (Berger, 2010) , Additionally, this unpredictability in both path and intensity is strongest for storms in the Gulf Coast (Wilkens, 1995) . This was evident in August 2005 when Hurricane Charley was predicted to hit land near Tampa, but quickly intensified and changed to a more easterly path. While much of Tampa was evacuated, the storm eventually hit land near Fort Myers, catching off-guard and enraging many residents who had chosen not to evacuate. Therefore, while early forecasts are available to use for decision-making, only very near-term forecasts have a high degree of accuracy and those generally don't offer enough time for an evacuation (Regnier and Haar, 2006) . Attempts to increase the lead time, i.e. issuing an evacuation earlier due to the longer clearance time, would include accepting greater forecast error.
As a result of this need for earlier information, technological investment has increased prediction accuracy for forecasting storms by about 1% each year since 1970 (Goldenberg et. al., 2001) , though predictions of hurricane intensity have not improved between 1990 (average 3-day error of 20 MPH) and 2010 (average 3-day error of 21 MPH) (Berger, 2010) . Numerous studies are being conducted from the technological aspect on how to improve forecasts of the path and intensity of a storm. In 2009, the National Weather Service office in Houston initiated a project to improve forecast track accuracy by 50% over 10 years (Berger, 2010) . Currently, predictions are made five (or more) days in advance, but these early forecasts are not reliable for evacuation decision making. The ultimate goal of investments in prediction technology is to be able to issue an evacuation based on the 5-day (or even a 7-day) forecast in order to appropriately evacuate the public far in advance of the storm and with ample evacuation time. 1 Overall though, there is still a great deal of uncertainty in predicting where the storm will hit land, and even more uncertainty in predicting the intensity of a storm at landfall.
The Outcomes of Evacuation Decision Making
Based on the above information, it is clear that evacuation decisions are made given a less-thanperfect forecast of where the storm will land, resulting in the potential for many evacuations to be made "needlessly", an event we label a "false alarm". At the same time, a community may not be evacuated and the storm may hit the community, resulting in an "unpredicted hit." Both of these events can be viewed as "mistakes", particularly by constituents who feel they have been inconvenienced (monetarily or otherwise), since the decision to evacuate or not does not correspond to the eventual landfall location of the storm.
These decisions can be seen as mistakes even if the decision made was probabilistically correct (we discuss evaluation and outcome biases in Section 4.1).
Each type of mistake has an associated cost. The costs of a false alarm include expenditures due to the hiring of personnel to staff shelters, extra emergency staffing (e.g., police, fire), and transportation of citizens to shelters. Additionally, indirect costs include lost business due to closings, as well as lost tourism.
An estimate made by the NHC is that the total cost to evacuate one mile of coastline is approximately $1 million (Massey, 2002) . This estimate depends largely on the type of businesses in the area, and could be much higher, reaching $50 million per mile in some areas . Thus, despite the natural tendency of county managers to act in a conservative manner (evacuate to minimize loss of life), the rising costs of unnecessary evacuations have made county managers carefully weigh the inherent tradeoffs (Lindell & Prater, 2007) . This has been amplified by a growing trend by those who closed their businesses once an evacuation was issued to question the decision of the authorities and demand compensation for the lost business when the storm ended up not affecting the community (e.g., Schultz, 2006) .
The costs associated with the alternative "mistake" of an "unpredicted hit" mostly include the cost of the loss of human life, as well as damages to homes and infrastructure not adequately secured. While there may still be loss of life even if an evacuation is made, the loss would no doubt be greater in the absence of an evacuation. The late decision to evacuate New Orleans as Hurricane Katrina approached could be considered an unpredicted hit, since the evacuation that took place was inadequate to minimize risk to inhabitants.
Given the uncertainty in hurricane forecasting, and the potential for severe damage including loss of life, the decision making process on whether to issue an evacuation for a given community is complex and difficult. As one emergency manager explained, the job is not for someone who dislikes ambiguity or who lacks confidence in his/ her decisions (Smith, former Emergency Management Director of Chatham County, Georgia, personal interview, 2002) . Our model in Section 3 begins to formalize how this decision is made, given the various complexities mentioned above.
A MODEL OF THE DECISION MAKER'S DILEMMA
To investigate the role that stakeholder pressures play in affecting evacuation decision making, we construct a simple model of the inputs, choices, outcomes and updating. The model functions at two levels and, at each level, identifies sources of noise affecting the decision making process to produce results that may be non-socially optimal. The first level is the individual decision maker, where personal reliance on stakeholder support affects both choices of tradeoffs and how those tradeoffs update based on experience and history. Such considerations may be optimal and rational for the decision maker, but may not be socially optimal. The second level focuses on the fact that multiple actors may be involved in the decision making process, and that multiple counties are making decisions simultaneously. The role of stakeholder influence may then become more complex as different actors make different tradeoffs. Below, we first introduce the overall model in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, and then discuss each of these levels in greater detail in Section 4.
Action-Outcome Combinations in the Model
Our model outlines the dilemma facing decision makers in terms of type I and type II errors, a traditional view of tradeoffs involved in decision making. The core idea is derived from Signal Detection Theory (SDT) (Green and Swets, 1966) , which has been used to illustrate previous risk analysis problems in commercial relations between buyers and sellers (Lampel & Shapira, 2001 ) and failures in due diligence (Puranam, Powell & Singh, 2006) . In those and similar situations, the decision maker is faced with the possibility of committing one of the above errors, both of them costly. We focus on SDT as a method to model hurricane evacuation decisions for three reasons. First, SDT allows us to consider both judgments and outcomes (as opposed to biases that affect only judgments). Similarly, SDT is useful for considering both the probability of an event and the severity of the event (as opposed to considering probabilities alone). Second, SDT is especially useful for framing the tradeoff between type I errors, or errors of commission (false alarms in our context), and type II errors, or errors of omission (unpredicted hurricane hits in our context). As we discuss in detail, the job of the decision maker is to balance these two types of errors, and SDT is focused on this tradeoff. Third, as we focus not just on individuals but also entire decision making systems, SDT fits as an approach for considering organizational decision making (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Sorkin, Hays & West, 2001 ). The consequences associated with the decision on whether to evacuate are described in Figure 2 .
-----Insert Figure 2 about here -----Initially, the decision about whether or not to evacuate is made by comparing the decision maker's evaluation of the threat (x) to their county-specific evacuation threshold (x*). If x ≥ x* then an evacuation is issued, while no evacuation is issued if x < x*. The hurricane threat (x) includes factors such as the strength and path of the hurricane and the accuracy of hurricane forecasting technology, while x* (discussed in more detail in Section 3.2) includes factors such as evacuation costs and the population density of the region. After the decision is made, the success of the decision is determined primarily by whether or not the storm hits land and causes damage in the particular community, which may or may not have been evacuated. A critical level y* is set as a benchmark against which damage is measured. 2 If the ex-post damage is greater than y*, an evacuation decision is considered necessary. It is classified as a failure if y ≤ y*, that is if it becomes clear ex post that evacuation was unnecessary. The predictive validity of the evaluation criteria used in making the evacuation decision is described by the correlation coefficient rxy.. The higher the correlation, the thinner is the ellipsoid in Figure 2 .
We encounter four possible action-outcome combinations as a result of an evacuate/not evacuate decision. If an evacuation is ordered (i.e., x ≥ x*) it can eventually either be deemed necessary (y > y*) or unnecessary (y ≤ y*). The former action outcome combination is called a "true positive" while the latter is called a "false alarm". If, on the other hand, an evacuation has not been made (i.e., x < x*) there are also two possibilities:
If a positive evacuation would have helped save lives or facilitated dealing with the storm's damage, it is labeled an "unpredicted hit". If it proves unnecessary (i.e. the storm did not hit the community) it is called "true noise".
Origin of the Evacuation Threshold (x*)
The evacuation threshold (x*) is determined by the individual decision maker based on input from other parties (as discussed in Section 2), and is specific to the county. The derivation of x* is intuitive but complex. In essence, the threshold derives from the point where the decision maker is indifferent between evacuating or notif the perceived hurricane threat is above that indifference point, an evacuation will be called. This indifference point can be thought of as the point where the costs of making each type of mistake (a false alarm or unpredicted hit) are equal. 3 We focus on understanding the costs of these mistakes, which are represented in Figure 3 . In the figure, the horizontal axis is the same range of x as in Figure 2 and the vertical axis depicts the unnecessary costs generated by a decision to evacuate or not, which we label as "Expected Costs of Mistake", as the axis denotes the cost times the probability of incurring the cost needlessly.
-----Insert Figure 3 about here ----- Figure 3 features two curves. The downward sloping curve captures the cost of a type I or commission error -the cost of evacuating needlessly. At the lowest level of x (where the hurricane poses no threat), the unnecessary cost is a, which is the full cost of evacuation for the community (including police and rescue costs, lost business revenues, shelter costs, etc.). Much of the value a is based on the population size and the availability of roads and transportation. Other important factors include local businesses that depend on tourism. Also included in a is the potential for loss of life during the evacuation process, such as when 35 people died during the Houston-area evacuation in the face of Hurricane Rita in 2005 (Ackerman & Markley, 2005) . It is important to note that, as the population in areas prone to hurricanes continues to increase, the costs of unnecessary evacuations continue to increase dramatically. At the right of the graph, there is a point where this curve meets the x-axis and the unnecessary cost of evacuation goes to zero as it is clearly necessary to evacuate the population in the face of such a strong and threatening hurricane. In between, we see that the level of unnecessary evacuation costs declines from a as the expected damage caused by the hurricane increases, as such increases in hurricane intensity increase the likelihood that any costs incurred by evacuation may be justified and not unnecessary.
The second curve in Figure 3 slopes upward to the right and captures the cost of a type II or omission error -the cost of not evacuating when the hurricane hits. At low levels of x where the hurricane is not a threat, there is very little cost in not evacuating, but as the expected storm severity increases, the costs of not evacuating rise. These costs are driven by human elements (mortality, injury, trauma, etc.), behavioral factors (the reduced likelihood that residents will take necessary precautions if an evacuation order is not given), and liability factors. 4 These costs rise to a maximum level of b, the cost of total devastation if the community is not evacuated in the face of an exceptionally dangerous storm. 5 At the intersection of these two curves is an indifference point -the point at which the decision maker is indifferent between issuing an evacuation or not, considering the potential costs of being wrong. This point is the source of x*, the evacuation threshold. Thus, Figure 3 suggests that x* depends on two factors, such that x* = ƒ(a, b), where a is the full cost of evacuation and b is the maximum theoretical cost of not evacuating. The aspects of the costs (a and b) that are felt by the general public are discussed above. The goal of this paper, however, is to understand how stakeholders affect those costs as perceived by the decision maker to alter the decision from being only about risk of life and evacuation costs, but also to include the potential risk to the decision maker's political future and the preferences of different stakeholder groups. We use this model to develop and explain the propositions that we discuss in the following sections.
STAKEHOLDERS AND HURRICANE EVACUATION DECISION MAKING
In this section we utilize our model of threshold setting ( Figure 3 ) introduced in Section 3.2 to describe how stakeholders affect hurricane evacuation decision making processes -either actively by influencing the decision, or passively by having their expected concerns considered by the decision maker. The propositions are developed in multiple ways. Each builds on prior research on decision making and stakeholders, but also shows a perspective filtered through our Section 3 model emphasizing the costs of type I and type II errors. Where available, we offer primary and secondary data (both qualitative and quantitative) that we have collected about hurricane evacuation decision making to illustrate the proposition. In order both to inform the context of hurricane evacuation and to contribute to theory on stakeholders and decision making, we state each proposition twice -first as it specifically applies to hurricanes, and second as it relates to broader theory on decision making.
The quantitative data that we use to illustrate our theory cover eight hurricanes making landfall in or higher cumulative chance that the center of the storm would come within 65 nautical miles of the county over the three days before a storm hit land. We proxy for the damage caused by the storm with maximum wind speed, and consider a storm to have hit a county if wind speed for any part of the county reached 70 mph. This can be viewed as a conservative classification as hurricane force winds are sustained wind speeds of at least 74 mph. Thus, a county is considered to have suffered a false alarm if they evacuated and local wind speeds never rose higher than 70 mph. The basic structure of the data is reported in Table 1. -----Insert Table 1 about here -----
Stakeholders and Individual Decision Making
Prior research on stakeholders suggests that managers consider stakeholder perspectives when making decisions (Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999; Greening & Gray, 1994) . Building on this literature, we suggest that decision makers may be conscious of how stakeholders (including local businesses and individual constituents) will judge the appropriateness of their actions. This awareness of stakeholder considerations creates political costs that are added to the actual costs of type I and type II errors, effectively increasing a and/or b in Figure 3 . Note that these costs are felt by the decision maker alone and do not reflect societal costs, and thus represent a resource dependence argument where actors rely upon others for key resources and therefore make deference to their preferences (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . In the case of hurricane evacuation decision making, political officials such as those typically making evacuation decisions depend on stakeholders for re-election votes (individuals) and campaign contributions (individuals and businesses). Thus, stakeholders can be seen as creating a filter through which information about the environment (i.e., the hurricane and the needs of the community) are perceived by county managers (Boyd, Dess & Rasheed, 1993) .
Outcome Bias and Worst Case Scenarios
The established concept of "outcome bias" refers to the likelihood that ex post evaluations by stakeholders judging the effectiveness of the decision maker will be based on actual outcomes and not whether the choice was right given pre-event conditions (Baron & Hershey, 1988) . Ex-post evaluators have been shown to rate the decision making process as better if it comes to the correct decision in the context of uncertainty (Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995) . Two hurricane-related examples highlight this outcome bias. First, during the 1998 hurricane season Billy Wagner, emergency manager of Monroe County, issued an evacuation of the Florida Keys for Hurricane Georges even though the storm was 3 days and 1,000 miles away. This was the earliest that any evacuation had ever been issued. When Max Mayfield, director of the NHC, heard about Wagner's action he said, "I hope you don't lose your job" from issuing the evacuation (Hampson, 2001 ). The storm ended up having a direct hit on Key West and, ex post, Wagner was viewed as making the best decision. Second, one emergency manager from Chatham County, Georgia, was fired two years after he made a decision to evacuate the county for Hurricane Bertha. The county commissioner fired the emergency manager, claiming that the evacuation was unnecessary since the storm hardly ended up affecting Georgia, and the evacuation caused much economic loss (Hampson, 2001 ). These examples demonstrate how the evaluation of the decision may be made based on what actually occurred, so that a lucky guess (in either direction) may be rewarded more than a sound judgment.
Outcome bias is important to the extent that it affects ex-ante decision making processes, as decision makers consider how stakeholders will evaluate them (Baron & Hershey, 1988) . We suggest that consideration of ex-post stakeholder evaluation is likely to make the decision maker fixate on the worst-case scenarios in extreme conditions. Many officials have shown a public concern with the worst-case scenario, especially after experiencing the devastation such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992. As one official in Pinellas County (west of Tampa) stated, "If there is an error to be made, I would much rather be talking to someone who is mad because we told them to leave than to a widow we didn't tell to leave and [her] house is 40 miles out in the ocean," (Gilpin and Shaw, 1998) . Such a focus on outcomes (and not on the process of decision making) may lead decision makers to be more proactive in self-justification and defending their judgments to those to whom they are accountable (Simonson & Staw, 1992) . The ex-post focus on the actual outcome when the decision maker is being evaluated makes the four discrete quadrants of Figure 2 the most salient features that decision makers may consider, as opposed to considering the validity of the decision (for example) as a continuous variable. For more dangerous hurricanes, the potential costs of an unpredicted hit may be seen as most salient, and decision makers may be more likely to lower their evacuation threshold and evacuate even if the hurricane is highly unlikely to hit. By contrast, for weaker hurricanes, the expectation may be that any evacuation or pre-storm preparation may be too costly as the storm is unlikely to cause significant damage. Nearly all stakeholders, including businesses and individuals, would be frustrated and angry about being asked to evacuate for a very minor hurricane that stood little chance of affecting them. This may in part explain why the state of Vermont was unprepared for Hurricane Irene in 2011, as the storm had been downgraded long before reaching Vermont but was nearly guaranteed to hit the region, which suffered massive flood damage. Earlier, Governor Corbett of Pennsylvania expressed concern that residents and local officials would let their guard down based on the downgrading of Hurricane Irene's strength (Murphy, 2011) .
This perspective -that decision makers may fixate on the worst-case scenarios of severe (but unlikely) unpredicted hits and needless evacuation costs -suggests that decision makers (such as mayors and county managers) charged with allocating resources to avoid disasters will see as salient the costs of both type I and type II errors. Interestingly, this contrasts with how the costs of errors may be perceived in cases where decisions may result in net positive benefits (such as accepting or rejecting potential projects or considering investments). When considering strategic projects, type I (false positive) errors may produce swift and obvious feedback. Type II (false negative) errors, however, may only produce feedback if competitors accept a project erroneously rejected by the firm, and only then if acceptance is visible and carries competitive implications. Thus, in cases where decision makers are assessing whether or not to accept projects that hopefully will be beneficial for the organization, we might expect only the costs of false positives to be considered as a worst case scenario, which might bias decision making towards minimizing false positives. By contrast, the presence of stakeholders that bear significant costs for both types of errors (as in the case of hurricane evacuation) may lead decision makers to focus on two different worst-case scenarios (the chances of devastation for a highly unlikely but strong storm, and the chances of stakeholder outrage over an unnecessary evacuation for a weak storm) more than the classic "expected value" of probability times expected damage. Such consideration is likely to subjectively increase the worst-case costs of type I and type II errors (a and b in Figure 3 ).
Proposition 1: Decision makers will focus on the worst-case scenario and the intensity (wind speed) of the storm rather than the entire set of parameters. For stronger storms this raises the perceived threat level, resulting in an increase in the number of false alarms. For weaker storms this lowers the perceived threat level, resulting in an increase in the number of unpredicted hits. In general, the presence and interests of cost-bearing stakeholders provides immediate and salient feedback on errors, which may lead decision makers to consider the costs of errors for which there typically is limited post-decision feedback (namely type II errors).
In line with Proposition 1, Table 2 shows the occurrence rate for false alarms and unpredicted hits (type I and type II errors) for the four strongest versus the four weakest hurricanes (assessed by wind speed at landfall in Florida). The data suggest the occurrence of false alarms was nearly twice as high during stronger versus weaker storms, while the occurrence of unpredicted hits was approximately 50% higher during weaker versus stronger storms. Again, these data are only intended to be illustrative, but suggest that the rates of mistakes for stronger versus weaker storms are qualitatively different.
-----Insert Table 2 about here -----
Prior Errors and Increasing Costs
For a county manager, prior errors may change the costs of additional type I or II errors. For example, during the 1999 hurricane season in Florida, two early storms threatened South Florida (Hurricane Floyd and Tropical Storm Harvey). Evacuations and school closings were issued for both Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, but neither storm hit the area. In general, the media pays significant attention to stories of money lost through needless evacuations. This media coverage gives an issue more prominence in the mind of the manager than it would otherwise receive (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009 ) and this visibility for unhappy business owners increases the legitimacy of their claims for accommodation (Julian, Ofor-Dankwa & Justins, 2008 ). The result is that decision makers who have upset a visible and powerful stakeholder group through past actions that have (ex-post) been deemed unnecessary are likely to accommodate the desires of that group when making future decisions. About a month after Floyd had completely missed South Florida, just as the forecasters had predicted, another hurricane was brewing off the Gulf Coast, Hurricane Irene. Given the past two unnecessary evacuation orders and school closings, local officials in both counties were reluctant to issue another evacuation during the threat from Hurricane Irene. The decision on whether or not to issue an evacuation came down to politics; officials in both counties felt that they could not politically afford to issue a third "unnecessary" evacuation, and therefore no evacuations or school closings were issued. However, as "luck" would have it, the storm came from the southwest and went right over the two counties. Many citizens were in disbelief that no evacuations were made (Norcross, 2002 ).
Miami's experience with Floyd, Harvey and Irene is an example of how previous errors can lead county managers to increase their evacuation threshold, resulting in a higher chance of unpredicted land hits.
The effect of these political considerations can be considered as additional costs that add increase a for the next decision, the cost of a needless evacuation. The impact of this change on the threshold (x*) can be seen in Figure 4 . In this figure, the original evacuation cost level (a1) is increased to a2 after multiple previous false alarms. This shifts the cost curve for type I (false positive) errors upwards, which shifts the evacuation threshold upwards from x* to x**. Transferring this new threshold back to Figure 2 , it is apparent that the increased threshold (with no corresponding increase in y, the actual hurricane damage) results in fewer false alarms but an increased risk of unpredicted hits (type II errors). Thus, decision makers perceive a rise in the costs of making the same type of error repeatedly, which leads them to adjust their threshold in ways that reduce the risk of making that error (false alarm) again. This shifting of the threshold, though, produces an increased risk of making the opposite type of error in the future. Decision makers may be seen as overcompensating for having previously had too low of a threshold (i.e., trying to make a rational adjustment but going too far), but in fact may be choosing to adjust their threshold in ways that limit their own personal liability (by ensuring that they won't make the same mistake repeatedly). (either "false alarms" or "unpredicted hits") raise the political costs of making the same mistake again. This increased cost of one type of error leads the decision maker to adjust the evacuation trigger in a way that reduces the previous error but at the same time increases the probability of the opposite type of error ("unpredicted hits" or "false alarms") . In general, as stakeholders will penalize decision makers more for making the same type of error repeatedly than for making different types of errors, decision makers will respond to one type of error by trying to minimize the chances of that error occurring again.
Proposition 2: Previous evacuation decisions that resulted in errors
-----Insert Figure 4 about here -----Our data on Florida storms from 2004-5 illustrate this proposition, though only in the case of false alarms leading to unpredicted hits as in the example above. 6 Table 3 reports the results of a logistic regression showing that the likelihood of an unpredicted hit increases when the prior storm that threatened the county resulted in a false alarm. The model uses standard errors clustered at the level of the county, and includes dummies for each of the storms in the data (as we have already suggested that unpredicted hit rates may be higher for smaller storms). The results show that a false alarm for one storm in the county increases the likelihood of an unpredicted hit for the next storm by more than 400% (p < 0.01). This simple model presents results consistent with Proposition 2 and suggests that false alarms may force managers to raise their threshold, thus exposing them to greater risk of unpredicted hits.
-----Insert Table 3 about here -----
Stakeholder Salience and Timing
In many cases, the decision maker may face different stakeholders with conflicting perspectives on the proper evacuation threshold. A key question then becomes how the decision maker reconciles these conflicting preferences. In the next propositions, we present two complementary views of such reconciliation in the context of hurricane evacuation.
6 Our data actually suggest that a few counties repeatedly seem to suffer unpredicted hits, which we attribute to the fact that some counties do not issue mandatory evacuation orders as they do not have the resources to provide shelters and police services. In most states, the "issuance of an evacuation order generally triggers the provision of a variety of services" (Fairchild, Colgrove & Jones, 2006) . A former FEMA director has stated that counties and cities ordering mandatory evacuations must have the resources available to evacuate the poor, elderly, and sick (Nagin, 2011: p. 185 ). These counties may issue voluntary evacuation orders without incurring such costs.
First, it is worth noting that disagreements in stakeholder opinions are likely to emerge to the extent that different stakeholder groups differentially bear the costs of type I versus type II errors. For hurricane evacuations, false alarms are more costly for businesses than the general public. False alarms force businesses to close unnecessarily and may have reputational implications for perceived riskiness (for potential business partners, for insurance companies, and for other parties). For example, the 2011 New Jersey coastal evacuations for Hurricane Irene were estimated to cost the Atlantic City casino industry up to $45 million in lost gaming revenue for a one-weekend closure (Parry, 2011) . The unnecessary evacuation of Miami in the face of Hurricane Floyd in 1999 resulted in an estimate of over $2 billion in cost, largely driven by lost business revenue for the evacuation of more than 2 million people . The financial implications of a false alarm for individual residents are likely to be painful but less costly. By contrast, unpredicted hits present huge costs for both businesses and individuals but are likely to disproportionately present risks for individual citizens. Many homes lack proper safety mechanisms and many homeowners lack adequate insurance, and yet many of the areas most prone to flooding from hurricanes are residential areas. Examples include parts of New Orleans (Mid-City and the Lower Ninth Ward are both below sea level), the coastal areas of the North Carolina Outer Banks, and the entire coastal area of Staten Island in New York. For residents in these areas, the costs of an unexpected hurricane hit -in terms of loss of life, as well as property not adequately secured -may be catastrophic. The degree to which a manager's cognitive frame takes into account the perspective of a stakeholder group is related to the power and legitimacy that the group has with respect to the manager (Agle, Mitchell & Sonnenfeld, 1999) , the extent to which these stakeholders may withhold key resources if their perspective isn't accommodated (Frooman, 1999) , and the degree to which the demands fit the manager's existing cognitive frame (Bundy, Shropshire & Buccholtz, forthcoming). We therefore expect that public officials with different dependence on businesses versus community groups may adjust their evacuation threshold to accommodate priorities of these groups.
Examples of the importance of specific managerial framing include the Florida Keys, where heavy financial losses from needless evacuations made local residents resist evacuation orders since they made the tourists leave and led to economic losses (Morgan and Johnson, 2009 ). More specifically, Brinkley (2006) reports that even after the Louisiana Governor had declared a state of emergency, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin "said that he needed to talk with his lawyers about what his options were" (p. 20) for alternative levels of evacuation in the face of Hurricane Katrina. And Brinkley adds that, "On Saturday afternoon, Mayor Nagin endangered the welfare of the poor and the elderly as well as the tourists -and in the end, the city -by holding legal discussions about the impact of an evacuation on the hotel trade" (p. 34). These examples show how stakeholder groups may oppose certain actions, and how that opposition might affect decision making.
Prior work on stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992) and accountability (Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, 1989 ) has highlighted the fact that decision makers may take the perspectives of stakeholder groups into account when making decisions. Decision makers may "simply adopt positions likely to gain the favor of those to whom they are accountable" (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999: p. 256 ). These prior works, however, focus largely on the certain implications of the different decisions that managers may make (e.g., where to locate a new manufacturing facility, or laying off employees). Our focus on hurricanes extends this perspective by emphasizing that cases of extreme uncertainty may make the costs of mistakes in judgment the most salient factor when considering stakeholder influence. Decision makers may alter their own perception of the costs of different types of errors to mirror those for the most salient stakeholders. Specifically building from our model, we expect officials that are closely aligned with business lobbying interests may raise their evacuation threshold (x*) versus other officials through a corresponding rise in the cost of a false evacuation (a rise in a).
Political officials that rely on voting and financial support from community groups would be more likely to err on the side of evacuation, increasing the risk of false alarms through a politically-driven rise in the cost of an unpredicted hit (a rise in b and the upward-sloping curve in Figure 3) . Thus, the influence of stakeholders will effectively cause decision makers to factor an additional cost of potential errors into their evaluation, as their political future shares some of the costs of mistakes that are borne primarily by one group or another.
Proposition 3: Business-oriented decision makers are more likely to raise their evacuation threshold and thus experience a larger number of unpredicted hits, while community-oriented decision makers are more likely to lower their evacuation threshold and thus experience a larger number of false alarms. In general, decision makers will seek to minimize errors of the type most costly to those stakeholders that control important resources for the decision maker's future.
If the first view on how decision makers reconcile conflicting stakeholders focused on power (P3), our second perspective focuses on timing. There are three possible scenarios affecting timing. First, a stakeholder group might be able to put pressure on the decision maker before the decision is actually made. Given that there is typically some lead-time before a final hurricane evacuation decision must be made, it is reasonable to expect that some groups might be able to place pressure on the decision maker immediately, prior to an evacuation decision. Second, a group might be able to voice their displeasure with a decision soon after the hurricane passed (either hitting the county or not). To the extent that the group's concerns would be clear to the decision maker ex ante, and their ability to affect the decision maker's discretion post-decision is also clear, this group may be able to influence the decision itself. Third, a group might have a specific opinion, but might not have their voice heard until much later. A common example would be a group whose voice would not be heard until re-election time for the official in question. With any perceived discounting of future costs and benefits, the three cases would affect the decision in declining order -the perspective of a group that has influence before a decision is made would receive the most weight, while a group that had to wait until election day would receive the least weight.
Such a view on the timing of stakeholder influence suggests that decision makers might lean more towards business-oriented stakeholders (who may prefer to minimize false alarms) under many circumstances, as these are the stakeholders that would be represented by a pre-established mechanism such as a chamber of commerce. Since the lobbying group exists independent of the occurrence of a hurricane, the group would have influence pre-decision or (at the latest) immediately after. Being represented by a pre-existing group allows the business community to have a more direct influence on hurricane evacuation decision making. By contrast, the general public (who would tend to prefer false alarms to the more dangerous unpredicted hits) may need to wait until election day to have a direct influence (via voting), which would limit the extent to which their opinion might be taken into account before the evacuation decision is made. The discounting of the preferences of community members would depend, of course, on the timing of the next election -a decision maker facing a hurricane evacuation decision in the September before a November election may prioritize the preferences of the community due to the proximity of the election. Jointly, this perspective suggests that some groups (in this case the business lobby) may have a more continuous level of influence over decision makers due to their consistent ability to exert influence, while other groups (in this case community members) may have a limited degree of influence except when there is a pending mechanism for voicing their opinions.. Barnett (2007) terms the "stakeholder influence capacity," where factors beyond those that traditionally drive salience such as power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell, Agle & Woods, 1997) will affect how decision makers view stakeholders. The idea that (for example) unionized employees may influence decision makers more than non-unionized ones is clearly akin to the role of power, but the idea that influence may vary over time is a novel concept that emerges from our model of hurricane evacuation decision making. This variance over time, and its implications for current decision making, stems from the fact that stakeholders exert influence at particular moments, and the impact of influence in the distant future is discounted back to the present. Research on accountability has considered the role of timing of accountability (e.g., Fox & Staw, 1979) , but has focused exclusively on pre-versus post-decision accountability and not on potential lags between decisions and accountability. Overall, we expect that:
This idea that stakeholder influence may vary over time is related to what

Proposition 4: For elected decision makers, the influence of pre-existing business-oriented lobbying groups should increase the likelihood of unpredicted hits, except during election years when the proximity of Election Day increases the likelihood of false alarms. In general, stakeholder group influence over decision makers will increase in the context of established and pre-existing processes for the stakeholders to withhold resources, while those stakeholders whose means of influence is more abstract and distant in time may have their influence discounted.
Stakeholders and Multi-Actor Decision Making
In Section 4.1 we focus on the role of stakeholders in influencing a single decision maker. However, as discussed earlier, hurricane evacuation decisions are never made alone. In addition to the pressures placed on decision makers by outside stakeholders, there are two other aspects of the multi-actor nature of this process that deserve specific attention. First, multiple counties are likely threatened by the same storm, so the micro-level processes discussed above are happening in multiple places simultaneously. This may encourage decision makers to pay attention to what other decision makers are doing, and the prior failures of others may force stakeholders to increase pressure on the focal decision maker. Second, even within a single county, there are multiple staff members or other players that may advise the ultimate decision maker. Aggregation processes affect how perceptions and errors are altered by group discussion (Csaszar & Eggers, forthcoming; Kerr, et al., 1996) , and we suggest that how these different opinions are aggregated may be affected by the perceptions of stakeholders.
Stigma and the Failure of Others
Stakeholder political pressures are likely to affect a decision maker not just based on their own prior decisions (as discussed in Proposition 2 above), but also by the experiences and prior decisions of other decision makers around them. Such stigmatization of one agent by the actions or mistakes of similar or related actors is an important part of sociological research on norms and categories (Pontikes, Negro & Rao, 2010) . In the context of hurricanes, the mistakes of others may influence how stakeholders see decision makers in counties even if they did not make a mistake themselves. A string of recent storms hitting one region, for example, might have effects both practical and political. From a practical perspective, frequent storms may increase the costs of additional evacuations as the county runs short of funds to manage evacuations (increasing a in Figure 3 and increasing the evacuation threshold), or the damage caused by prior storms may increase the risks to residents (as was the case in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, where the broken levees provided little protection for residents), which would result in more evacuations. From a political perspective, the effect of recent storm hits on a region is likely to be accentuated when the decision makers make a large number of decisions that turn out to be wrong -either false alarms or unpredicted hits.
The latter is likely to be especially threatening, as seeing the damage of a bad decision in a similar context should make local decision makers even more at risk of reputational damage from making a similar mistake in the future. Extending existing work on stigmatization by the actions of others (Jonsson, Greve & Greve, 2009; Yu, Sengul & Lester, 2008) , our perspective suggests two primary contributions -first that the mistakes of others can increase the costs of making the same mistake for other, similar organizations, and second that decision makers will (via the model outlined earlier) factor this increased error cost in their decision making process, and thus encourage them to minimize that specific type of error in the future (which raises the likelihood of making the opposite type of error).
Illustrating this effect, Table 1 shows storm-level data for the eight Florida storms discussed earlier.
In looking at the table, we see that for the first storm, Hurricane Charley, there were a high percentage of counties that were caught off guard, and did not evacuate. This was especially important as Charley was the strongest hurricane to hit Florida since Andrew, killed 25 people, and surprised residents of Port Charlotte 
Proposition 5: Recent storms that hit nearby regions -especially when those regions failed to evacuate -may increase political pressure to avoid an unpredicted hit, leading to more frequent evacuations. This may increase the number of "false alarms". In general, salient and highly public mistakes (type I or type II) of other actors may increase political pressure to avoid the same mistake for the focal decision maker, which then increases the chances of making the alternate type of mistake (type II or type I).
Imitation of Larger Actors
The above perspective suggests that the decisions made in individual counties should not be viewed as independent, but recognized as interdependent. Such interdependence gives rise to the likelihood that decision makers who have made evacuation decisions that turn out poorly may be able to deflect blame onto others. Consider the case of Hurricane Floyd in September of 1999. Despite Floyd's path towards the eastern Florida coast, NHC forecasters were almost certain that Floyd would turn north and miss Florida. Even with this forecast, several county managers wanted to issue an evacuation (including the mayor of Miami). In their minds the storm was too big to take chances, and an evacuation was warranted in case the forecast was wrong. However, the problem for these decision makers was that the NHC had not yet issued a hurricane warning for the area because the NHC forecasters were almost certain it would make the predicted turn.
Many local officials requested that the NHC issue a warning for their communities so that they could issue an evacuation even though forecasters were almost certain the storm would not affect Florida's coast (Sheets and Williams, 2001 ). These county managers needed the legitimacy of an NHC warning in part to reduce potential criticism if they were wrong. This concern about the blame for potential mistakes can also be illustrated by the remarks of Louisiana Governor Mary Landrieu before Hurricane Katrina. In issuing the evacuation, she made it clear that such a decision was in response to President Bush's urging to do so. This remark may have been motivated by a hope that, if the storm did not hit, she would not be deemed responsible for an unnecessary evacuation.
The key question becomes how this consideration of the ability to deflect blame might affect ex ante decision making. One interview subject in our fieldwork suggested that, to lower the chance that an emergency manager may be "blamed" for a wrongful decision, smaller counties may often wait to see what larger counties are doing before making a decision (Collins, personal interview, 2002) . Once a larger county adjacent to a smaller county issues an evacuation, the county manager of the smaller county will most likely also issue an evacuation. This is consistent with Marcus and Nichols' (1999) finding that firms closer to the safety border have limited resources and often look to others (consultants, in their case) to help them manage decision making. Such imitative decision making shifts some responsibility from the smaller county manager to the larger county manager. We expect that, when multiple counties make the same wrong decision (either to evacuate or not), the largest and highest status of those counties is likely to bear the largest volume of public displeasure over the mistake -the media and the public are likely to focus on these high status decision makers as responsible for the mistake (Merton, 1969; Wiesenfeld, Wurthman & Hambrick, 2008; Giordano, 1983; Graffin, et al, 2012) . Such a situation may deflect potential blame for local decision makers who can point to the higher status decision maker (e.g., the mayor of the largest nearby county that made the same mistake) and deflect blame on them. This imitative decision making strategy may provide personal benefits for the decision maker in the event of a mistake, but it is not socially optimal. As shown earlier, the appropriate evacuation decision making process depends on the perceived threat (x), which is dependent on the county-specific threat of the hurricane, and on the evacuation threshold (x*), which includes such countyspecific factors as the costs of evacuation and the costs of a direct hit. As these factors change from county to county, imitating another county's decision is unlikely to improve the process. This perspective agrees with recent theorizing that there may be important boundary conditions on the extent to which imitative behavior is beneficial for organizations (Csaszar & Siggelkow, 2010) . Much of the existing literature on imitation argues that imitative behavior would generally be beneficial (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006) . Despite the fact that imitation or legitimating decision making by borrowing a strategic decision from a larger county may be non-optimal, counties are likely to engage in this behavior to minimize their responsibility from the decision in case it is viewed as wrong. This perspective offers a complementary view of the reasons behind imitative behavior in contexts facing high uncertainty -instead of looking to high status actors to provide legitimacy for organizational actions (Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Henisz & Delios, 2001 ), decision makers may imitate to provide legitimacy for their potential mistakes.
Proposition 6: Smaller counties' officials are likely to follow the action of neighboring larger counties in order to have the opportunity to deflect blame for mistakes onto larger counties, and this may increase evacuation decision making errors (both type I and type II). In general, the decision to imitate larger, higher-status actors may be based in part on the expectation that these actors will bear a disproportionate amount of stakeholder scrutiny in the event of an adverse outcome.
Once again, our Florida hurricane data from 2004-5 provide anecdotal evidence of this proposition.
First, we can use the data to explore the extent to which smaller counties imitate the decisions of nearby larger counties. Table 4 assesses the likelihood that a small (less than 90 th percentile in terms of population) county evacuates based on the percentage of larger counties (90 th percentile or higher) that evacuated, conditional in each case on being threatened by any given storm. The data show that more big counties evacuating (even when using a county-level random effect) is correlated with more smaller counties evacuating. Second, if we group the counties according to the median of population size and consider both types of mistakes together (false alarms and unpredicted hits), the error rate for larger counties (>120,000 residents) is 28.8%, while the error rate for smaller counties is 37.5%. While these are both consistent with Proposition 6, there are other possible explanations for the differences (e.g., differences in resources used to make accurate decisions) and a real test of the proposition would require more granular measures of the timing of evacuations and information on what data the managers actually considered when making the decision. We offer the data only to illustrate consistency with the proposition.
-----Insert Table 4 about here -----
The Risks of Overruling Subordinates
As laid out in Figure 1 , county managers receive advice and input from a variety of sources. These include the NHC, other political officials, and their own staff members. How decision makers aggregate and integrate these different opinions is an interesting question, and prior research suggests that individual biases may be either amplified or alleviated by group-level discussion (see a review in Kerr, et al., 1996) , that different aggregation mechanisms may have different implications for how uncertainty is handled (Csaszar & Eggers, forthcoming) , and that decision makers may be more or less likely to take advice in different contexts (Soll & Larrick, 2009 ). We extend these perspectives by focusing on the effect that external stakeholders may have on the aggregation and discussion processes for hurricane evacuation decision making. Take, for example, the case of a county manager that has received a recommendation from subordinates to evacuate in the face of the hurricane. If the county manager agrees with this decision, then an evacuation order will clearly be issued. If, however, she does not agree with the decision, then stakeholder response considerations present a challenge. If the county manager overrules her subordinate and it turns out that the subordinate was correct (the county should have evacuated), then the political risks to the decision maker if anyone were to discover that they overrode a recommendation to evacuate would be very damaging. Given that the politically-driven backlash against overriding a recommendation would likely be driven mostly by the media (and, in these days, by Facebook and Twitter), we expect that recommendations to evacuate will be more difficult to overrule than recommendations not to evacuate (where the eventual decision maker could be seen as "protecting the common man"). This is not to say that county managers would never overrule their subordinates, only that the concerns about the potential implications may marginally raise the necessary threshold to evacuate. Thus, we would expect that the aggregation process in an environment where stakeholders are active and informed might accentuate individual-level effects that incline decision makers to prefer evacuation (either stakeholder-driven effects such as those discussed earlier, or more classic cognitive biases). We suggest that the decision not to evacuate might then need to be unanimous, in order to limit the chance of significant negative political fallout. This perspective suggests that, for formal hierarchical decision making structures such as a subordinate passing along a recommendation to an ultimate decision maker, the decision to override a subordinate's recommendation is not simply a matter of the decision maker assessing their own opinion.
Instead, the political costs of overriding may become especially large when there is a risk that the subordinate's opinion might become known, especially if one type of error (in this case the cost of an unpredicted hit) has broad political implications for a number of stakeholders. A clear non-hurricane example of this type of political cost would include the backlash against the Bush administration under allegations that the CIA had explicitly predicted terrorist action in the U.S. in the late summer of 2001 (e.g., Washington Post, 2006 . The perception that the administration may have overrode a recommendation to be more proactive made critics even more upset. In another example of the costs of overriding a recommendation, a group of NASA contractors that worked on the space shuttle Challenger were concerned with the cold launch conditions in January of 1986, and recommended that NASA abort the launch. One of the NASA officials that overrode the recommendation was pushed into early retirement in the aftermath of the disaster (Fischer, 1986) . While work on decision aggregation (e.g., Sah & Stiglitz, 1986) has considered endogeneity in the screening process, the focus has been on how subordinates alter their own thresholds based on the knowledge of a higher decision maker. What has not been considered is the effect on the ultimate decision maker of the specific recommendations of subordinates. In the case of hurricanes, it is entirely possible that the recommendation by any subordinate to evacuate becomes difficult to override for the decision maker, thus leading to a higher rate of false evacuations than may be socially optimal. Thus, the aggregation of individual opinions may lead not only to the preservation or amplification of specific individual biases (Kerr, et al, 1996) , but also to the creation of new types of errors as the ultimate decision maker considers the implications of the opinions of subordinates. 8
Proposition 7: The decision to override a subordinate's recommendation to evacuate will be politically risky, leading to a higher-than-optimal rate of false alarms. In general, the decision to override a subordinate's recommendation may take into account not only the decision maker's beliefs but also the political risks involved with public disclosure of the decision to override.
In our data, it is obviously impossible to ascertain the "optimal" level of evacuations, but the fact that the overall unpredicted hit rate in Table 1 is only 6.9%, while the overall false alarm rate is 27.0% is consistent with the idea that decision makers will lean towards evacuating more often. Of course, the fact that the costs of not evacuating prior to a storm hitting (b in our earlier models) are significantly higher than the costs of an unnecessary evacuation (a in the earlier models) also plays a role.
DISCUSSION
This study integrates theory on decision making and theory on stakeholder influence to offer a model of hurricane evacuation decision making with implications for decision making in general. Our model focuses on the role that the costs of errors (type I and type II) play in setting the action threshold for decision makers, and how consideration of stakeholder pressures affect those costs in ways that benefit the decision maker (or organization) but not necessarily society as a whole. In general, it is the job of managers and decision makers faced with making decisions with risk on each side of the equation to find the proper balance between type I and type II errors -any attempt to reduce the number of type I (false alarm) errors without increasing the validity of the prediction model will increase the number of type II (unpredicted hit) errors (Csaszar, forthcoming) . But this balancing act is complicated, especially given the significant uncertainty and consequences associated with hurricane evacuation decision making. Consideration of stakeholder concerns -both through direct influence and indirect consideration of preferences by the decision maker -can readily tip this balance one way or another.
The opinions of stakeholders likely gain salience in the context of hurricane evacuation decision making because decision makers are largely unable to rely on learning to help make decisions and must turn to other sources for information. Despite the fact that hurricane evacuation decisions are made regularly and are supported by institutions (like the NHC) with large amounts of data, learning within this process is made challenging for five reasons that conflict with some of the basis tenants of learning theory as discussed by Argote (1999) . First, the key factors that affect decision making in one county may differ greatly from those in another, based on geography, population, transportation, etc. Second, even local communities have been changing rapidly over time as populations migrate and demographics change. Third, lucky guesses and vocal stakeholders blur the feedback received by managers to aid learning. Fourth, decisions involve multiple layers of actors, and coordinating learning across those layers is challenging. Finally, the actual decision maker in charge often changes with political changes, limiting memory and learning. For these reasons, we feel that this context is especially beneficial for the study of stakeholders as their salience may be maximized.
Our study contributes to literature on decision making both by offering a model that integrates decision making and stakeholder influence, and by using the model to offer specific propositions that are novel within the realm of decision making. We discuss these contributions in greater detail below, as well as outlining our contributions on hurricane evacuation decision making more specifically, and crisis decision making in general.
Integrating Decision Making, Behavioral Theory, and Stakeholders
As discussed earlier, there is relatively little work that integrates decision making and stakeholder theory (Gavetti, et al, 2007; Reynolds, et al, 2006) despite the original Behavioral Theory of the Firm's emphasis on politics and decision making (Cyert & March, 1963) . Indeed, March viewed organizations as political coalitions of actors with conflicting goals (March, 1962) . Generally, the role of conflict and politics in decision making and behavioral theory (when studied at all) has focused on conflict within groups, divisions, and organizations. To integrate the role of extra-organizational stakeholders, we offer a model of the decision making process that focuses on the costs of errors in judgment and how they are borne by different external stakeholder groups. This perspective that the costs of errors may drive the action threshold (as in Figure 3 ) is novel within the literature on decision making, and allows us to link decision making and stakeholders through the political costs (and potentially benefits) that stakeholders impose on decision makers depending on their preferences. The core intuition is that, to the extent that the costs of a specific type of error (type I or type II) are borne disproportionately by one stakeholder group in relation to another, that group is likely to put pressure on the decision maker to tip the balance towards minimizing that specific type of error. The decision maker then must factor into account the degree to which he or she depends on that stakeholder group for resources, which links to common aspects of stakeholder management such as salience and power (Mitchell, Agle & Woods, 1997) , but also includes novel aspects of this resource dependence such as temporality (as discussed in P4). Our approach provides granularity on how the key parameters in the classic SDT model are derived, and provides a framework for future exploration of factors that affect the costs of mistakes. This includes future exploration of the role that stakeholder considerations play in the process of decision making.
More specifically, we state our propositions in two ways -once specific to hurricane evacuation decision making to take advantage of the richness of our context, and once more generally to provide a series of specific contributions to the existing literature on decision making. Some of the propositions are distinctly novel. For example, P4 emphasizes the role played by time in the consideration of stakeholder pressures, which suggests that the influence of some stakeholder groups will wax and wane depending on the temporal proximity of specific events that allow those stakeholders to exert their influence. Such a perspective highlights not just the resource dependence between decision makers and stakeholders, but also the ways in which those resources are made available to decision makers. Proposition 7 suggests that the salience of stakeholders will increase the risks of overruling a subordinate, as the political backlash would be greater if the public was aware of the subordinate's recommendation. Typical models of information aggregation in group decision making (e.g., Sah & Stiglitz, 1986) have suggested that the process may affect the decision threshold, but have typically focused on the role that the knowledge that a subordinate's decision will be reviewed has on the subordinate's process. We suggest that the threshold setting process of a decision maker is also endogenous to the presence of subordinate recommendations, which represents a more complete view of the process of group decision making.
Other propositions echo existing themes in the literature, but offer nuanced processes behind the theory.
For example, P2 states that decision makers will grow wary of making the same mistake multiple times, but suggests a rationale tied to the fact that key stakeholders will punish such repeat offenders, not necessarily because decision makers overcompensate for a previously erroneous action threshold. Similarly, P6 suggests that decision makers may imitate the decisions of higher status actors, but emphasizes that a significant rationale may be the desire to deflect stakeholder displeasure if the decision results in a mistake. Future empirical work could focus on disentangling the specific rationales for why decision makers appear to make biased decisions.
This study suggests that stakeholder influences on decision makers are likely to result in a socially inefficient balance between type I and type II errors. Of course, finding the socially optimal balance is not a trivial task, and stakeholder feedback on the validity of prior decisions can be a viable means for a boundedly-rational decision maker to search for the optimal balance. But our suggestion is that, when a specific stakeholder group has a greater influence over one decision maker than they would over a potential replacement or when the group has more influence at the current moment than they would at a different moment, then we are likely to see an inefficient reaction to stakeholder pressures as the decision maker weights those concerns more than others. It would be interesting for future research to consider ways that organizations could be structured to minimize the effect of this type of imbalance. One would likely be to establish effective means for all stakeholders to communicate their opinions to the organization, to make sure that those with pre-existing influence mechanisms (such as lobbying groups) do not receive undue weight. Another would be to utilize group decision making involving individuals with very different stakeholder relationships and resource reliance. In this case, these different opinions might cancel each other out. In general, steps that lead the organization to proactively consider the role of stakeholders in decision making, as opposed to being reactive to vocal stakeholder groups, would lead the organization to strike a better balance. Future research could explore these options and others to see how different organizational structures and decision making processes lead to better balance.
Overall, this study represents a step forward in the integration of the disparate literatures on decision making and stakeholders. Each has largely ignored the other, or incorporated a simplified version of the other's theories, and this study seeks both to provide a framework for future integration and draw some initial conclusions from the integrated model. We see this study as a first step towards offering a coherent extension of the Behavioral Theory of the Firm to account for stakeholders and other external actors that influence decision making in organizations (Gavetti, et al, 2007; Argote & Greve, 2007) .
Policy Implications for Hurricane and Other Crisis Decision Making
Hurricanes present a complex challenge for evacuation decision making. As Goldenberg et al. (2001) cautioned, the high-level hurricane activity of the mid-and late-1990s might persist for decades to come. Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) warn that the scale of damage from hurricanes has been going up rapidly, creating problems for both the insurance industry and local decision makers. Given this complexity and the increasing threat, what can this study suggest as changes for hurricane evacuation decision making? Three factors seem most relevant to consider. First, our model suggests that county managers likely know that they will be evaluated largely on the outcomes of their decision, and not the process behind these decisions. This recognition is likely to lead to fixation on the worst-case scenario (P1) and the imitation of others to deflect blame (P6). While it is likely impossible to alleviate these problems completely, better transparency into the process and data used to make decisions may lead to more focus on the best decision making processes, as opposed to focusing only on the clear outcomes. Second, the fact that county managers may overweigh the preferences of specific stakeholder groups (P3 and P4) suggests that policies could be put in place that reduce the subjectivity (at least from a cost perspective) of hurricane evacuation decision making, and that decisions should likely be made for entire regions more than by individual counties (where individual allegiances are more likely to play a role). Such a process may both reduce the inefficiencies of imitation and balance the needs of various stakeholder groups more efficiently. Third, our model raises multiple concerns about decision makers using hurricane evacuation decision making as a stage for political posturing (namely P4, P6, and P7). In addition to the ideas mentioned above, taking steps to preserve the secrecy of individual opinions while still increasing transparency in the process may help to avoid potential inefficiencies resulting from elected officials caring more about their own political future than the needs of the community. An alternative might be to leave the evacuation decision to non-elected officials to minimize inefficient stakeholder influence, thought this of course presents additional complications. Some policy changes have been implemented or proposed that would address some of the concerns raised in this paper. For example, the NHC has considered eliminating its hurricane classification system and the distinction between hurricanes and tropical storms, as the lower classifications can encourage people to take these storms less seriously (Harper, 2011; Berger, 2009) . As another example, the insurance company ACE USA developed several insurance products that help minimize the subjectivity in the decision to shut down a business during an approaching storm by creating objective trigger points based on NHC forecast.
When this trigger point is reached, an insured private company will be able to recoup costs incurred due to an business shutdown. These products may thus increase the number of evacuations made (as these business stakeholders may decrease their efforts on lobbying for increasing the evacuation threshold), but may decrease the costs of doing so to a covered company. The general interest in the products has increased and decreased based on the previous season's storm activity. For example, the products were developed shortly While these findings apply to hurricane evacuation decision making, there are important analogues with decision making in similar circumstances with high public risks and costs, such as the TSA and airplane safety, military operations, and disaster planning operations within private organizations like nuclear power plants and mining operations. This study contributes broadly to our understanding of decision making and risk in crisis situations, such as those studied in nuclear power management (Marcus & Nichols, 1999) , space shuttle disasters (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) , earthquakes (Garmaise & Moskowitz, 2009) , and emerging research on the subprime mortgage crisis. It is likely that many of the influences outlined in this study would be prevalent in these and other settings, which should provide both advice for policy and avenues for future research.
Conclusions
Overall, this study integrates perspectives on decision making and stakeholder influence through a model of decision making in the context of hurricane evacuation decisions. The model identifies that the evacuation threshold derives from the costs of errors (both type I and type II), and that those costs are driven in part by consideration of stakeholder preferences. We use the model -augmented with qualitative and quantitative data on hurricanes in Florida and elsewhere -to derive a series of novel propositions that illustrate the specific ways in which stakeholders can influence the decision making process. The study represents a first attempt to focus on the evacuation decision makers themselves (as opposed to evacuees or hurricane forecasters), and contributes both to our understanding of how policy makers should approach hurricane evacuation decision making processes, and how researchers can integrate decision making and stakeholder theory. 
